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How to Read (Anything as) Art 
by Kari Jormakka 
Alberti defines beauty in architecture as a state of harmony in so much as that any 
change in the building would be for the worse. Yet, it is hard to believe that any physical 
object can ever become so perfect. Hence, Alberti seems to leave us with only two 
alternatives; either there can never be beauty in architecture, or else architectural 
masterpieces and other works of art are not material things at all, but rather belong to 
a world of Greek necessity, inhabited by gods and, if Freud is right, dreams as well. 
Through a discussion of architectural criticism, I try to show how works of art are 
constituted in interpretation as perfect artifacts in such a way that Alberti's vision is 
both possible and inevitable.1 
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IN NOTRE DAME DE PARIS, Victor HugO claims that architecture was the primary medium of communication before Gutenberg because a 
building was more accessible and resistant to 
the ravages of time than a precarious manu-
script. "To destroy the written word there is need 
only of a torch and a Turk. To destroy the con-
structed word there is need of a social revolution, 
a terrestrial upheaval."2 
To elaborate his linguistic analogy, Hugo de-
scribes architecture as writing, the structure of 
which is similar to that of ordinary language. 
He claims that architecture was first an alpha-
bet: an upright stone was a letter, and each letter 
was a hieroglyph, and on every hieroglyph res-
ted a group of ideas, like the capital on the co-
lumn. Words were constructed when stone was 
laid upon stone; the Celtic dolmen and crom-
lech, the Etruscan tumulus, the Hebrew galgal, 
are words. The temple of stones at Karnac is a 
complete sentence. "Last of all," Hugo writes, 
"they made books. - to the dictation of the pre-
vailing idea of the epoch, they had written these 
marvellous books which are equally marvellous 
edifices: the Pagoda of Eklinga, the Pyramids 
of Egypt, and the Temple of Solomon. - Solo-
mon's temple, for example, was not simply the 
cover of the sacred book, it was the sacred book 
itself. On each of its concentric enclosures the 
priest might read the Word translated and made 
manifest to the eye - . - Thus, during the first six 
thousand years of the world - from the most 
immemorial temple of Hindustan to the Cathe-
dral at Cologne - architecture has been the great 
manuscript of the human race. And this is true 
to such a degree, that not only every religious 
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symbol, but every human thought has its page 
and its memorial in that vast book." 
In addition to articulating the structural ana-
logy between language and architecture, Hugo 
attempted to read the meanings of architectural 
sentences. Written in architecture, he discerns 
"the law of freedom": every civilization starts 
with theocracy and ends with democracy. For 
example, the Romanesque period is a new be-
ginning after the fall of Rome and therefore a 
theocracy. Hence, everything in the Romanes-
que style "represents authority, unity, the imper-
turbable, the absolute, Gregory VII; always the 
priest, never the man: everywhere the caste, 
never the people." The Gothic age is quite the 
opposite: the pointed arch of the Gothic style 
symbolizes the new freedom of the bourgeoi-
sie. The Gothic cathedral bids "farewell to 
mystery, to myth, to rule. Here fantasy and cap-
rice are a law unto themselves. - The four walls 
belong to the artist. The stone book belongs no 
more to the priest, to religion, to Rome, but to 
imagination, to poetry, to the people."3 
Reading vs. projection 
For the purposes of this paper, we need not de-
cide how accurate Hugo's interpretations are but 
some of his strategic moves merit attention. If 
architecture has the same structure as ordinary 
language, one would expect they are read in the 
same way. Yet, Hugo's example of deciphering 
the meaning of architectural sentences is not 
how we usually read. Typically, we somehow 
identify the language of the text, and then de-
code the message accordingly to determine what 
the text says. Instead, Hugo already knows, be-
50 KARIJORMAKKA 
Authority. 
Ruins of the 
abbey church 
of Notre-Dame, 
Jumièges, 
ca 1050. 
Manifestatio. 
Villard de Honnecourt, 
detail of the interior 
elevation of Reims 
Cathedral, 1235. 
The people. Notre-Dame de Paris during the Fête 
de Libération of 1830. From Texier, Tableaux de 
Paris, 1852-1853. 
Concordantla. 
St. Nicaise 
(destroyed), 
Reims, 
ca. 1230-1263. 
fore starting to read, what the meaning of each 
sentence is: what he wants to do is to determine 
how the meaning is embodied the architecture. 
In other words, he wants to determine the code 
on the basis of the meaning. 
Though this may not sound like reading at 
all, one should not dismiss the idea too easily for 
it characterizes the best of art and architectural 
criticism. Consider Erwin Panofsky's interpre-
tation of Gothic architecture as parallel to schol-
astic philosophy.4 Having postulated manifes-
tatio, or clarification, and concordantia, or re-
conciliation of opposites, as the two principles 
characteristic of scholasticism, he points out 
analogical features of Gothic cathedrals. The 
panoply of clearly articulated shafts, ribs, butt-
resses, tracery, pinnacles, and crockets in a 
cathedral is for Panofsky a self-analysis and 
explication of architecture just as the apparatus 
of parts, distinctions, questions, and articles in 
scholastic Summae is a self-analysis of reason. 
The dialogue of reason and faith in philosophy 
and the integration of the rose window into the 
system of pointed arches in a cathedral are his 
illustrations of the acceptance of contradictions. 
To make the analogy between philosophy and 
architecture plausible, however, Panofsky has 
to ignore many features of Gothic architecture 
which other historians emphasize, such as the 
dematerialization of stone, the mystical, colored 
light which pervades the church; and the exag-
gerated verticality of the space. Surprisingly, 
the great iconologist overlooks iconography, as 
well, both the elaborate Christian symbolism as 
well as the more general metaphorical represen-
tation of a forest or a mountain.5 
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Still, it is not the idiosyncratic focus which is 
most remarkable in Panofsky's reading but its 
utter banality. Two centuries after Vico's Scienza 
nuova it was not the least bit original or provo-
cative to indicate similarities in Gothic philo-
sophy and architecture. Then again, the problem 
facing an art critic is not to make original rea-
dings or discover unexpected meanings but to 
show how a few plausible meanings are embo-
died in the particular work and to determine 
which elements are the bearers of a preconcei-
ved meaning. 
The exegetical model 
In this sense, Panofsky's reading can be viewed 
as a projection of a pattern of meaning on the 
object of interpretation.6 The strategy is appro-
priated from exegetics which uses projection for 
two reasons. Firsdy, the universe is a projection 
of God's essence. Since omne agens agit simile 
sibi, as Thomas Aquinas likes to insist, every 
effect necessarily bears a relation of likeness to 
its cause and, conversely, exemplarity is an es-
sential property of the efficient cause. God the 
Creator being the primary efficient cause of the 
universe, He will have impressed His stamp of 
similarity upon every being.7 Secondly, the uni-
verse and the Bible have the same meaning. 
God has given humanity not one but two books, 
the Bible and the Book of Nature. Yet their mea-
nings are identical for God is not diglossos or 
forked-tongued, saying one thing here and an-
other there.8 When confronted with an obscure 
Biblical passage, a meaningless object, or an ab-
surd historical event, an interpreter may then 
safely assume that it also contains a translation 
of God's unitary message. 
While there is a certain logic to exegetics, it 
is not self-evident that a projective reading of an 
artwork were legitimate once we refuse to take 
works of art as the self-expressions or projec-
tions of a divine being. We can, of course, postu-
late other supernatural subjects, such as the spi-
rit of the times. The Zeitgeist theory is nothing 
but a secularized version of exegetics; it also 
fixes the meaning of every phenomenon in ad-
vance. Heinrich Wolfflin insisted that to explain 
a style cannot mean anything else but "to insert 
it into the general history of the age according 
to its expression; to demonstrate that in a langu-
age of their own, the forms of a style say nothing 
else than the other organs of the age."9 Analog-
ously to an exegete, the Wolfflinian critic wants 
to show how a style expresses a meaning which 
is determined from other sources. If we could 
accept the Zeitgeist theory the projective method 
would then be justified but collective subjects, 
such as the spirit of the times, are notoriously 
problematic philosophically. 
Fortunately, there are other ways to legitimize 
art critical projection. Consider exegetics again. 
An exegete attempts to show how an obscure 
passage in the Bible can be understood as an 
expression of a basic religious tenet, and a theo-
logian wants to demonstrate how even appar-
ently senseless suffering is an essential part of 
God's redemption scheme. They situate the texts 
or events to be interpreted in a field of religious 
meanings in order to reach a religious under-
standing, as opposed to a historical or scientific 
one. In the same way, a projective reading of an 
object as an artwork relates it to meanings and 
values that belong to the internal discourse of art 
history. 
Art criticism as projection 
An artistic interpretation must present the ob-
ject as a work of art. In other words, the work as 
interpreted must display properties we expect of 
artworks. The interpretation of an artwork is, 
then, a projection of an idealized artwork onto 
the object. This implies that we can read phi-
losophical speculations on the nature of art as 
norms of interpretation rather than descriptions 
of objects. 
Though attempts at general definitions of art 
have consistently failed, there remains a surpri-
singly wide consensus among philosophers from 
Aristotle to Arthur C. Danto and critics from 
Winckelmann to Clement Greenberg on what 
good works of art are like. They are character-
ized by "aboutness"; i. e. they have something 
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to say, usually something of profundity and re-
levance to all humankind. Originality is another 
commonly accepted characteristic of works of 
art; Danto claims that it is analytical to the con-
cept of an artwork that it be original. Many cri-
tics and philosophers would further agree with 
George Dickie's claim that artifactuality is a 
necessary property of all works of art and that 
unity is a property all works have in common. 
Related to the concept of unity is another char-
acteristic which modernist critics typically take 
for granted; it could be called total determina-
tion. For example, W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
C. Beardsley state as axiomatic that in a poem, 
"all or most of what is said or implied is rele-
vant; what is irrelevant has been excluded, like 
lumps from pudding and 'bugs' from machi-
nery." In a similar manner, Rudolf Amheim de-
clares that "things which have no significance 
have no place in a work of art," while Danto 
takes it "as categorical with Warhol that there 
are no accidents."10 
If these properties are characteristic of art, 
then a reading of an object as an artwork must 
be able to articulate similar characteristics, or 
else the object does not embody an artwork. Sur-
veying actual art criticism, I find it to be the rule 
that of two competing interpretations of a ma-
terial thing as a work of art that reading is pre-
ferred which better satisfies the following four 
conditions: 
1. Artifactuality: all the aspects of the object 
which are included in the reading can be 
attributed to the direct intentional caus-
ation of a human author. 
2. Unity: all such aspects can be explained 
from one principle which the author can 
have intended. 
3. Meaning: the principle (and consequently 
the aspects) have meanings relevant to the 
'human predicament' directly or via other 
works of art which have such relevance. 
4. Uniqueness: the aspects suffice to indivi-
duate the work as a particular. 
The work is identified as the conglomerate of 
such aspects of the material thing; thus constitu-
ted the work will have the characteristics of art 
and, actually, be art. Most often, the object to be 
interpreted is a material thing but it can also be 
constituted in another kind of interpretation. 
However, it is here assumed that the material 
thing is not described in a reductive physicalist 
or perceptualist vocabulary stripped of its his-
torical context or social connotations but that it 
is a thing as understood in ordinary speech. As 
opposed to its bearer, a work of art is ontologi-
cally open in the sense that its constitution is de-
termined in an artistic interpretation. It is pos-
sible to recognize the limits and the elements of 
the artwork and decide which features the work 
shares with the bearer only relative to an inter-
pretation. 
Artifactuality 
The above conditions need some additional ela-
boration. The artifactuality condition means that 
only those features of the material bearer are 
features of the artwork which can have resulted 
from the artist's actions. Hence, natural pheno-
mena do not qualify as art. We do not read clouds 
as artworks even though we can read a found 
object as art. Obviously, no material thing is 
created ex nihilo by human hands; artifactua-
lity is always only partial even in things we 
would unproblematically classify as artifacts. 
What an artist takes as given, is typically not 
relevant. The flatness of a painting is not an ex-
pressive quality because it is dictated by the 
conventions of painting; the realism in a photo-
graph is not interesting because it follows from 
the medium. In found objects, there is nothing 
which the artist directly made in the material 
thing so that one focuses instead on the inten-
tional act of exhibiting it. In this sense, a refer-
ence to the author determines the limits of the 
aesthetic object as well as its aesthetic qualities; 
artistic features supervene on decisions which 
the author could have intended and for which 
he therefore has to take responsibility. 
Still, not every action an artist performs be-
comes part of the work. Even if the artist actu-
ally makes the frame of the painting or mixes 
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the paints the frame or the paint as a substance 
does not necessarily become artistically rele-
vant - unless they are intended as a part of the 
work. Typically, if we study a book in terms of 
binding we are not treating it as literature but as 
an example of book-making technology. How-
ever, in a few cases there is reason to include 
binding among artistically relevant aspects. Wil-
liam Blake, described by a contemporary as "a 
new kind of man, wholly original, and in all 
things," devised an original method of relief-
etching and book design in order to avoid com-
promising the uniqueness of his offering by 
more conventional methods of publication." If 
we deem Blake's inventions relevant, as we 
Exquisite Corpse (Greta Knutson, Valentine Hugo, 
André Breton, Tristan Tzara), Drawing, ca 1936. 
commonly do, it is by virtue of authorial inten-
tions for there has never been a widely accep-
ted convention of such comprehensive book art 
before or after him. 
Author 
However, the concept of author is itself proble-
matic. There are works of art that challenge tra-
ditional notions of authorship: these include Hans 
Arp's randomcollages; Marcel Duchamp's ready-
mades; Laszlo Moholy-Nagy 's Telephone 
Paintings which were executed by anonymous 
craftsmen following instructions the artist gave 
over the phone; the collective poems and draw-
ings by the surrealist group Exquisite Corpse; 
John Cage's chance music; Harold Cohen's com-
puter drawings; Sol LeWitt's mathematical per-
mutations; and Peter Eisenman's architectural 
"scalings". Still, the critic is not disarmed. If 
the work does not seem a product of an intention 
(ohjets trouves, ready-mades, and art produced 
by aleatory systems or generative algorithms), it 
only needs to be reassembled by the critic to re-
semble a paradigmatic case of art, such as a 
Rembrandt painting: e. g. if chance processes 
are employed, the description of the work focu-
ses on those aspects which can be attributed to 
the author, such as the innovative process or the 
gesture the work embodies. Hence, Ted Cohen 
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describes Duchamp's Bottle Rack as a gesture 
artwork because the artist had nothing to do with 
the materiality of the object, and Nina Hofer 
interprets Eisenman's Romeo and Juliet project 
as the process which then relates to fractals, 
simulation, origin, scale, and other contempo-
rary issues. 
There are also works which by nature are col-
lective rather than products of a single intention. 
Usually, even these works will be constituted so 
that they stand in a conventional relationship to 
an author's possible intentions. In the analysis 
of buildings, operas and other collective pro-
jects, Western critics typically ignore the collec-
tive dimension in favor of reconstituting the 
work in a way similar to paradigmatic works of 
ait, even if it might in some cases imply discer-
ning several works embedded in each other. 
Works with adistinctively collective appearance, 
such as a performance of Tristan und Isolde, are 
in interpretation usually divided into parts: the 
critic focuses on the composition as Wagner's 
achievement, the orchestral performance as a 
work of von Karajan, the Liebestod aria as a 
performance of Martha Modi. There are many 
other activities, such as architectural design, and 
city planning a fortiori, which have been some-
times presented as art, even though their pro-
ducts are relatively far from the paradigmatic 
work of art, and therefore the interpretation re-
quires various constructions. 
Unity 
Unity means that everything in the work must 
ultimately refer back to the same reason for its 
existence; i. e. only those features can be in-
cluded in the work which are determined by the 
same ergon. Again, this definition does not de-
termine the ergon but excludes certain elements 
as parts of the work. As Aristotle explains in 
the Poetics, "if the presence or the absence of a 
thing produces no distinguishable difference, 
that thing is not a part of the whole."12 But the 
principle from which everything should be de-
rived is not predetermined, either: it is chosen 
so that it explains as many aspects of the mate-
Sol LeWitt, All Combinations of Arcs from Corners 
and Sides; Straight, Non-Straight, and Broken Li-
nes. Wall drawing, 1975. 
Peter E isenman , Romeo and Juliet. Scal ing, 1986. 
rial thing as possible. If everything in a work of 
art (that can be expected to have been manipu-
lated by the author) is determined and meaning-
ful, then any detail of the material thing can in 
principle be used in an interpretation. From this 
follows naturally but not logically the familiar 
idea that a masterwork always yields new mea-
nings: the meaning of a work cannot be exhaus-
ted by any interpretation if in principle every-
thing in its material counterpart is potentially 
meaningful. 
Meaning 
The generic content of art is, according to the 
classic definition by T. M. Greene, the interpre-
tative expression of various types of perceptual 
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and spiritual universals and the interpretative 
portrayal of various types of complex human 
and non-human individuals. In other words, 
artistic statements can be categorized as reli-
gious, social, introspective, or profound in the 
sense of philosophy of life, or alternatively, as 
dealing with disciplinary issues.13 In painting, 
such issues might include problems of propor-
tion, perspective, and illusionism; in architec-
ture, axiality, spatial sequences, columniation. 
However pertinent these problems might be to 
the specificity of the particular art, we often feel 
that even these technical problems ultimately 
have some relevance to the human condition. 
In Donald Kuspit's view, the critic functions 
as the mediator for a full-fledged artistic mea-
ning, where such meaning is understood to make 
the ait responsible to world history rather than 
simply ait history. Stanley Fish suggests a num-
ber of ways a critic can produce such meaning-
ful interpretations: one can argue that the true 
subject of the text is its own composition, or that 
in the guise of fashioning a narrative the speaker 
is fragmenting and displacing his own anxie-
ties and fears; one can look in the text for evi-
dence of large mythological oppositions; a text 
can be viewed as an instance of the tension bet-
ween nature and culture. Three decades earlier, 
R. S. Crane was even more explicit, remarking 
that it requires no great insight to find an inner 
dialectic of order and disorder or a struggle of 
good and evil forces in any serious plot. He sug-
gested life and death, harmony and strife, order 
and disorder, eternity and time, reality and ap-
pearance, truth and falsity, certainty and doubt, 
true insight and false opinion, imagination and 
intellect, emotion and reason, complexity and 
simplicity, nature and art, the natural and the 
supernatural, nature as benign and nature as 
malignant, man as spirit and man as beast, the 
needs of society and individual desires, inter-
nal states and outward acts, engagement and 
withdrawal.14 
Uniqueness 
The requirement that the artwork be unique 
seems to apply to autographic arts such as pain-
ting, where the original is revered, but not to 
other aitforms. Henry van de Velde, for one, in-
sisted on the thousandfold multiplication of his 
creations.15 However, given the openness of the 
concept of artwork, the difficulty is easy to re-
move. If there can be more than one material 
counterpart to the artwork then the work of 
the artist, i. e. the work of art proper is seen as 
a type which is unique and original, and which 
can have been directly created by the artist, as 
suggested by the first condition. Thus, there can 
be many copies of a novel, many performances 
of a piece of music, many impressions of a gra-
phic print, many casts of a sculpture, and so on, 
but the materiality, temporal and spatial loca-
tion, of these instances or tokens are not pro-
perties of the work proper. 
Author in postmodern criticism 
Even if the above discussion would apply to 
some modernist and pre-modern criticism, it is 
reasonable to expect that postmodern criticism 
with its rejection of unity, totality and the tradi-
tional author operates differently. Disappoint-
ingly, however, even post-structuralist critics 
follow traditional methods of constituting ob-
jects of study and aesthetic appreciation. Roland 
Bardies' seminal essay "From Work to Text" is 
a striking example. After insisting that Georges 
Bataille cannot be described as a novelist, a poet, 
an essayist, an economist, a philosopher, or a 
mystic, Barthes exclaims: "yet Bataille wrote 
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texts," and continues, " - even, perhaps, always 
one and the same text." 
This puzzling aside - "one and the same text" 
- cannot be understood as saying that in his di-
verse writings Bataille repeated the same text 
a number of times, for if a text is constituted in 
an intertextual field, no two texts can be identi-
cal; even the identity of a single text - if such 
an oxymoron is allowed - must be unstable be-
cause the field itself is in a state of flux. There-
fore, the description "one and the same text" 
must refer to writings that are linked only by 
Bataille's signature which they bear and which 
separates them from the intertextual. Hence, in 
spite of his talk against the myth of filiation, 
Barthes isolates text by the author. Once this 
is done, it hardly matters if the meanings were 
anti-authorial allegories of postmodern obses-
sions. Authorial intention is always already in-
scribed in the postmodern critical act in its accep-
tance of the authorial object to be subverted.16 
But it is not enough for postmodern critics 
just to draw the limits of the artwork around the 
author; they also seem to struggle with the post-
modem ideal of openness and prefer to present 
the object of study rather as a closed unity, where 
every element is immanently justified, than as 
an opera aperta. While e. g. Paul Smith starts his 
reading of David Salle's Tulip Mania of Hol-
land by noting its postmodern qualities of deli-
berate meaninglessness, disjointed incoherence 
and provocative randomness, it only takes him 
a few pages to pull together every detail of the 
work and show that the painting is a rigorous, 
totally determined unity where everything, in-
cluding the initially enigmatic title, can be seen 
as contributing to a single (but appropriately 
postmodern) theme, "the pornography of look-
ing and - the male desire that underpins what 
we may call a will to representation."17 
Even Sherrie Levine's programmatic attack 
on authority and originality is systematically 
transformed to fit into a traditional paradigm. In 
flagrant violation of artistic codes and copyright 
laws, she has rephotographed original prints by 
Edward Weston, Walker Evans, Eliot Porter, and 
others. Nevertheless, Douglas Crimp explains 
that far from being a copyist, Levine is actually 
making a sophisticated original contribution to 
the post-modern discourse by pointing out that 
Weston's 'original photographs' are themselves 
appropriated images since they are based on the 
aesthetic ideals of classical sculpture and pain-
ting. Other critics restore Levine's originality by 
understanding her as commenting on the con-
cept of masculine author in general, or on simu-
lation and reproduction as the condition of con-
temporary society.18 Independently of what the 
artists are trying to do, critics of both postmo-
dern and more traditional persuasion constitute 
works as the unified and original creations of 
their authors. 
Summary 
In this paper, criticism has been described as the 
projection of an idealized conception of an art-
work onto the object of interpretation. At least 
the following four conditions are characteristic 
of the projection: artifactuality, unity, meaning-
fulness, and uniqueness. This method of inter-
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pretation is a variation of the principle of charity, 
or the idea that a correct interpretation is the one 
which makes the object as good an artwork as 
possible. 
The notion of intention here propounded can 
be compared to the critical theory of the En-
lightenment authors Christian Wolff and Johann 
Martin Chladenius. Their idea of intentionality 
does not refer to a psychological state or perso-
nality but to the specific genre of writing an au-
thor has set out to produce: it articulates a cate-
gory and indicates which aspects of the mate-
rial bearer are artistically significant aspects of 
the work of art. The conditions of artifactuality 
and unity function in the same way as guidelines 
for reading rather than descriptions of objective 
conditions. The meaning of the artwork builds 
upon the other three conditions, and ultimately 
provides the justification for the work's exist-
ence. 
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